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ABSTRACT
The literature on collaborative governance has generated several
comprehensive models detailing the conditions which collabora-
tions must meet to achieve collaborative performance. The impor-
tance of each separate condition – such as the presence of
incentives to participate, appropriate institutional designs, or facil-
itative leadership – has been validated in various studies. How all of
these conditions interact with each other, and whether all of the
conditions need to be present to achieve performance, is less well
understood. Leveraging the rich resource of the newly created
Collaborative Governance Case Database, this article explores the
different pathways to performance used by 26 local collaborations.
The analysis shows that the presence of strong incentives for part-
ners to collaborate is a crucial condition for success; almost all
performing cases shared this starting point. Performance was then
achieved by combining strong incentives with either clear institu-
tional design (e.g. explicit rules, transparent decision-making) or
with intensive collaborative processes (e.g. face-to-face dialogue,
knowledge sharing). This analysis shows that the current models for
collaborative governance can serve as roadmaps, laying out all of
the different conditions than may be important, but that collabora-







One best way or different roads to Rome?
Collaborative governance, and related forms of interorganizational collaboration, have
enjoyed an enthusiastic uptake among practitioners and researchers. A multiplicity of
theoretical models has been generated that explain how collaborative governance can be
made to work, with prominent contributions from the likes of Bryson, Crosby and
Middleton Stone (2006), Ansell and Gash (2008), Provan and Kenis (2008), and
Emerson and Nabatchi (2015).
Each model offers a different perspective on collaboration, but all seek to map what
conditions are relevant to achieving collaborative performance, such as the presence of
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benign starting conditions, institutional context, governance regime, leadership styles, or
accountability structure. In the words of Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012, p. 2), these
models offer a “framework enabling further analysis of the internal dynamics and causal
pathways of collaborative governance and its performance.”
Subsequent research has indeed leveraged these models to examine the relationship
between specific conditions. For example, Turrini, Cristofoli, Frosini, and Nasi (2010)
inspect the relationship between network leadership and effectiveness, while Cristofoli
and Markovic (2016) explore the link between resources, institutional design, leadership,
and network effectiveness. Such research has clarified the relationship between specific
elements of collaboration, but falls short of an integrated understanding of the interac-
tions and causal interdependencies between all of the conditions.
Specifically, it is unclear whether the simultaneous presence of all conditions considered
conducive to collaboration is necessary for realizing collaborative performance or whether
a select combination of specific conditions may suffice. We therefore ask the following
research question: What conditions of collaborative governance are necessary, and what
combinations of conditions are sufficient, for achieving collaborative performance?
Answering this question presents significant methodological challenges. Analyzing
different configurations of conditions and their results would require a relatively large set
of cases, necessitating at least a medium-N approach. However, each case must contain
detailed information about all of the conditions, including data about the performance of
collaborations, which can often only be found in small-N qualitative case studies.
The launch of the Collaborative Governance Case Database (Douglas et al., 2020) provides
an unprecedented opportunity to overcome these methodological barriers and address our
research question. The Collaborative Governance Case Database brings together highly
detailed case studies from experienced collaborative governance researchers from across
the world. These case studies contain both qualitative descriptions and quantitative scores
of the key conditions of the collaboration. This database offers the opportunity for amedium-
N analysis of the interdependencies between all different conditions.
The analysis here starts with a brief review of some of the influential models describing
collaborative governance, ultimately drawing particularly on the work of Ansell and Gash
(2008) to outline the conditions for collaborative governance and Emerson and Nabatchi
(2015) to define collaborative performance. We then conduct a fuzzy set Qualitative Case
Analysis (QCA) of the conditions in this model, using 26 case studies to explore the
different pathways through which these collaborations do or do not achieve performance.
The results offer three contributions to the literature. First, the analysis shows that
strong incentives for partners to collaborate are a crucial condition for success; almost all
performing cases shared this starting point.
Second, the analysis shows that collaborations then reach performance through
combining strong incentives with either clear institutional design or with intensive
collaborative processes and leadership. This finding suggests that the comprehensive
models such as the one tested here provide useful roadmaps of the different conditions
important to collaborative performance, but that collaborations can use different routes
to reach their goals.
Third, in a methodological contribution, this study shows how the new resource of the
Collaborative Governance Case Database can be used to test comprehensive models and
fundamental assumptions about collaborative governance. This opens up the
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opportunity for further tests, e.g. examining the other comprehensive models current in
the study of collaborative governance, and more detailed studies of the circumstances
under which different routes to collaborative performance occur and succeed.
Explaining collaborative performance
Collaboration may refer to a wide spectrum of phenomena, such as multi-sectoral partner-
ships (e.g., Herranz, 2008), policy networks (e.g., Klijn, 1996), inclusive management
practices (e.g., Quick & Feldman, 2014), or purpose-oriented networks (e.g., Nowell &
Kenis, 2019; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). Beyond their important differences, these
phenomena and their related streams of literature are concerned with collaborative, cross-
sector, formally designed, consensus-oriented endeavors, producing collective outputs.
Research into collaborative governance has created a large set of propositions about
the various key conditions that enable collaborations to achieve performance. To provide
a necessary theoretical and methodological focus, we here restrict our explorations to
models about collaborative governance specifically, where ‘one or more public agencies
directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is
formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public
policy or manage public programs or assets’ (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 544).
The models by Bryson et al. (2006), Ansell and Gash (2008), Provan and Kenis (2008),
and Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) seek to explain what makes this collaborative govern-
ance work. For example, Ansell and Gash (2008) propose that the realization of colla-
borative outcomes requires the interaction between four building blocks: The starting
conditions (e.g. asymmetry, sense of interdependence between actors), the institutional
design (e.g. explicit rules, transparency of decision-making), facilitative leadership (e.g.
ability to convene actors or mediate in conflicts), and the collaborative process itself
(maintaining a virtuous cycle of face-to-face contact, commitment to process, shared
understanding, and achieving intermediate results).
Starting from a different definition of collaborative governance, Emerson et al. (2015)
present a somewhat different perspective on the conditions for collaborative perfor-
mance. They argue that collaborative outcomes are produced by the interaction between
principled engagement (e.g. the shared deliberations and discovery between the actors),
shared motivations (e.g. trust and mutual understanding), and capacity for joint action
(e.g. institutional arrangements, leadership, resources), which takes place in the wider
context of the collaborative governance regime.
What these two models, and most other models for collaboration governance, share
beyond their differences is the assumption that various key conditions of collaboration
must be aligned to achieve collaborative performance. This is best represented by the
collaborative governance model of Emerson and Nabatchi (2015), where principled
engagement, shared motivations, and capacity for joint action are visualized as three
interlocking gears, jointly generating collaborative actions and impact. If one of these key
conditions were to malfunction, the whole machinery of collaboration would come to
a grinding halt.
An alternative perspective would be that not all conditions need to be present to
achieve performance, as forwarded in structurationist discussions about network forma-
tion and development (Berthod & Segato, 2019; Sydow & Windeler, 1998). For example,
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Raab, Mannak, and Cambré. (2015) showed how low resources in a collaboration can be
compensated with high administrative capacity. Cristofoli and Marckowiz (2016) found
in a study of health-care networks that different combination of resources and leadership
styles could still lead to the same good results (i.e. equifinality).
From these two rival perspectives on the interaction and causal interdependence
between the various conditions for collaborative performance, we distil two rival
propositions:
(A) All conditions of collaboration are necessary for achieving collaborative
performance.
(B) Different configurations of collaborative conditions can be sufficient for achieving
collaborative performance.
Importantly, collaborative performance is here not understood as merely ‘hitting the
targets’. A collaboration could be said to be ‘performing’ if it is achieving its goals
(Ansell & Gash, 2008), but could also be said to be successful if it maintains the
support among key stakeholders to survive, and needs to build resilience to sustain its
activities in the face of future challenges (e.g., Moynihan, 2009).
Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) summarize that collaborative performance is about
achieving effectiveness by achieving goals, maintaining legitimacy by retaining the sup-
port of among stakeholders, and building adaptivity by fostering resilience for future
challenges. We will build on this tripartite definition of performance when examining
our rival propositions.
Research design
Fuzzy set QCA and theoretical model
We test, in a preliminary fashion, our two rival propositions through a fuzzy set
Qualitative Case Analysis. QCA is specifically designed for exploring the interaction
and interdependence between different conditions (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008; Schneider &
Wagemann, 2010). QCA has the ability to identify multiple routes to the same outcome,
if they are indeed present in the case set. Using fuzzy set QCA as opposed to crisp set
QCA will also allow us to be more nuanced in weighing conditions such as leadership or
process, where ‘presence’ or ‘absence’ is not necessarily clear-cut.
QCA does require a clear set of theoretical propositions and set calibration guidelines
to code the cases. As discussed above, we build chiefly on the models of Ansell and Gash
(2008) and Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) to define the conditions to collaborative
performance and for defining collaborative performance. Both perspectives have gained
a lot of traction in the literature and – as will be discussed in detail below – align with the
data collected in the database. Future studies may use the database to test the mechanisms
of the other influential models about collaborative governance.
Ansell and Gash (2008) argue that collaborative governance is shaped by the interac-
tion between benign starting conditions (trust between the actors, little resource asym-
metry, clear incentives, awareness of interdependence), appropriate institutional design
(explicit rules, respected rules, transparent decision-making), facilitative leadership
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(ability to convene actors, steward the rules, mediate conflicts, and inspire action), and
intensive collaborative processes (face-to-face dialogue, shared fact-finding, problem-
solving, and marking intermediate outcomes). Ansell and Gash, however, are less specific
about what collaborative performance is. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) are particularly
helpful in explaining how performance is a combination of effectiveness, legitimacy, and
adaptability.
Combining these theoretical building blocks, we built a roadmap to collaborative
performance describing the assumed interaction between Incentives of Collaboration,
Institutional Design, Leadership, Collaborative Process, and Collaborative Performance
(Figure 1). Our analysis will test whether the recurrence of Performance always requires
the presence of the other four conditions. However, this model is still a simplification of
all the elements described by Ansell and Gash (2008) as not even the Collaborative
Governance Case Database could provide all of the data.
The opportunities and limitations of the Collaborative Governance Case Database
Describing the state of each of these five conditions and their respective sub-conditions
requires a detailed knowledge of every single case. Exploring the outcomes of different
configurations of conditions requires a multitude of cases to compare and contrast.
Previously, such work was hampered by the unavailability of datasets containing both the
required depth and mass of case studies (Douglas et al., 2020). Collecting all of this informa-
tion for a large number of cases would then be an immense and costly research effort.
The recently launched Collaborative Governance Case Database offers an opportunity
to leverage the combined case work of a multitude collaborative governance researchers
(Douglas et al., 2020). The case database is a common pool resource for collaborative
governance researchers to share high quality, previously published case studies. The
Figure 1. Roadmap for achieving collaborative performance (based on Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson &
Nabatchi, 2015).
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database contains individual case reports submitted by the original researcher, which
have been reviewed by an editorial board of collaborative governance experts.
The data in the case reports range from descriptions of the starting conditions of
the collaboration to assessments of the performance. The data is captured both
through quantitative scores on Likert Scales (e.g. “To what extent did the participants
have more or less equal levels of resources to bring to the collaborative process?”
(1 = Highly unequal, 5 = Highly equal)) and through open long-form questions e.g.
‘Describe the sense of interdependence between the actors.’). Each case report is then
17 pages long.
To ensure reliable and valid case reports, contributors also have the option to leave
a question empty if they do not have sufficient information. So while the case questions in
the database cover all of the conditions described in our theoretical model, not all reports
contained scores on all of the conditions we are interested in. For example, a large share
of case reports provided no information on the level of trust between the actors before the
collaboration started. Data related to conflict and collaborative performance were also
frequently absent.
The final roadmap as presented in Figure 1 is therefore both the product of the
available theory and the available data. The models of Ansell and Gash (2008) and
Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) provided the long list of conditions and sub-conditions.
We cross-checked these with the data available to make sure we would have sufficient
cases to test the model, ending up with three sub-conditions for each of the five building
blocks of the model. While specific sub-conditions are missing from this analysis, we can
still provide a richer analysis on a larger set of cases than previous studies.
Calibration and case selection
Calibrating the set memberships
The calibration of the set membership was informed by our theoretical model (explaining
what sub-conditions inform the presence or absence of a condition), the guidelines for
QCA calibration (e.g. Rihoux and Ragin, 2008), and the type of information gathered in
the database format.
For example, to score the strength of the Incentives condition, we looked at the scores
awarded on by the case author for the presence of resource equity (question 17 in the
database), incentives to collaborate (question 18), and sense of interdependence (question
19). For each of these questions, the original case contributor scored the case on a 5-point
Likert scale, ranging from 1 (e.g. ‘Very little incentives’) to 5 (e.g. ‘Very strong incentives’).
We considered a score of 3 as the condition being neither present nor absent and
a score higher than 3 as the sub-condition being present (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008). We also
applied alternative thresholds to check the sensitivity of our calibration and its impact on
the findings (see Further Analyses and Checks).
If all three sub-conditions were present, the case would be awarded a full 1.00 member-
ship of the Incentives condition. If the case contributor scored only two out of the three
sub-conditions as present, the case would only be a partial 0.67 member of the Incentives
set. If the case only had one sub-condition present, it would get a 0.33 membership. The
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membership would be 0.00 if the case had none of the sub-conditions present. We applied
the same approach to Institutional Design, Leadership and Process (see Table 1).
The performance dimension was coded using a similar approach, here drawing on the
scores for effectiveness, legitimacy, and adaptability awarded in Question 55, 58, and 59
of the case report (see Table 2). We considered the sub-condition Effectiveness present if
a case achieved more than 3 on goal fulfillment. If the case author marked ‘Increase
efficiency’ as a goal in question 10, we checked whether the collaboration scored more
than 3 on ‘Increase efficiency’ on question 55 about the performance of the collaboration.
As collaborations can have multiple goals, we considered Effectiveness present when the
collaboration achieved more than half of the goals deemed important for that collabora-
tion by the case contributor.
The membership score for Legitimacy was based on a similar principle. We considered
this sub-condition present if the collaboration achieved a score higher than 3 from more
than 50% of its stakeholders on question 55 about stakeholder support. The sub-
condition Adaptability was informed by a two-part question (question 58.1 the stake-
holder support for future endeavors of the collaboration and question 58.2 rating the
operational capacity for future endeavors). If the case scored more than 3 on the average
of these two questions, the sub-condition Adaptability was considered present.
Table 1. Calibrating the collaborative conditions and their sub-conditions.
Set membership rules Calibration from case format
Incentives
● 0 sub-conditions present = 0.00
● 1 sub-condition present = 0.33
● 2 sub-conditions present = 0.66
● 3 sub-conditions present = 1.00
Sub-condition is scored present if the score >3 on:
● Resource equity between actors (Q17)
● Incentives for collaboration (Q18)
● Interdependence between actors (Q19)
Institutional Design
● 0 sub-conditions present = 0.00
● 1 sub-condition present = 0.33
● 2 sub-conditions present = 0.66
● 3 sub-conditions present = 1.00
Sub-condition is scored present if the score >3 on:
● Rules are explicit (Q24)
● Rules are applied (Q25)
● Transparency of decision-making (Q27)
Leadership
● 0 sub-conditions present = 0.00
● 1 sub-condition present = 0.33
● 2 sub-conditions present = 0.66
● 3 sub-conditions present = 1.00
Sub-condition is scored present if the score >3 on:
● Ability to be convener of actors (Q32)
● Ability to be steward of rules (Q33)
● Ability to be catalyst of actions (Q34)
Process
● 0 sub-conditions present = 0.00
● 1 sub-condition present = 0.33
● 2 sub-conditions present = 0.66
● 3 sub-conditions present = 1.00
Sub-condition is scored present if the score >3 on:
● Degree of face-to-face contact (Q38)
● Degree of active interests alignment (Q42)
● Degree of knowledge sharing (Q41)
Table 2. Calibrating collaborative performance.
Membership rules Calibration from case format
Performance
● 0 sub-conditions present = 0.00
● 1 sub-condition present = 0.33
● 2 sub-conditions present = 0.66
● 3 sub-conditions present = 1.00
Sub-conditions are marked as present if
● Effectiveness: When more than 50% of the goals marked as important for
the collaboration (Q10) score >3 on goal fulfillment (Q55). This excludes the
legitimacy goals which are addressed under sub-condition Legitimacy
● Legitimacy: When more than 50% of the actors marked as important for the
collaboration score >3 on support (Q59)
● Adaptability: When future support and capacity are rated >3 (average of
scores for Q58.1 and Q58.2)
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Selecting and excluding cases
The database contained 44 cases at the time of writing (September 2019), all offering
information on various parts of our theoretical roadmap. However, we did want to pay
attention to the importance of context, particularly the level of collaboration. To make
the case set comparable, we selected only those collaborations which took place primarily
at the local level, although they could have had regional or national components. We did
allow for a variation in the exact governance regime, policy domain, and country of
origin, although all but one were set in OECD countries (see Table 3).
This left us with a first selection of 30 from the available 44 cases. Four cases had more
than one data point missing and were excluded, bringing the final total to 26 cases. Six
cases missed just 1 of the 15 required data points. Based on reading the qualitative
descriptions we were able to code these sub-conditions by drawing a score from the text.
Table 4 presents the final list of 26 cases and their respective scores. Appendix A provides
a table with all the raw data, marking the instances where we inserted data ourselves.
Moreover, all 26 cases used can be freely consulted online at the website of the Collaborative
Governance Case Database (link to be inserted on publication).
Analyzing the different pathways
Analysis of necessity: crucial role for incentives to collaborate?
We first assessed the necessity of each separate condition for the occurrence of
Performance (see Table 5). The commonly accepted consistency threshold here is 0.9
(Schneider et al. 2010): if a condition has a consistency score above this threshold it can
be deemed necessary for the outcome to occur. None of the conditions met this thresh-
old, although Incentives to Collaborative and Leadership scored relatively high (0,799
and 0,798, respectively).
Further analysis sheds an insight into this number. Not a single case which wholly lacked
the Incentives to Collaborate (scoring 0,00 on Incentives) managed to realize collaborative
outcomes (none scoring more than 0,33 on Performance). However, there were three cases
with limited Incentives (0,33) which achieve partial Performance (0,67) and two cases with
limited Incentives which achieved full Performance (1,00). The Incentives condition seems
to be important, but is not always necessary for achieving Performance.
Table 3. Overview of the selected cases.

























Number of cases in parenthesis.
aMore than one policy domains is possible for each case.
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Analysis of sufficiency: different configurations associated with performance
Turning to the analysis of the different pathways that lead to collaborative outcomes, we
first reviewed the truth table of Performance to survey what different configurations
occurred (see Table 6).
For example, the first line shows that there are two cases which have strong Incentives
and sound Institutional Design in combination with the occurrence of high Performance
(i.e. full membership of the Performance set). The eleventh row shows there are four
cases where all conditions for collaboration are absent and the association with
Performance is very weak (only 0,460 consistency with the Performance set).
As our model contains four causal conditions, which could be either present or absent,
there are 16 different configurations possible in theory. In this sample of 26 cases, eleven
configurations show up in practice. For example, a configuration that is theoretically
Table 4. Overview of cases.
Name in database Incentives Design Leadership Process Performance
Area C – Milan 0,33 0,33 1 0,33 1
Baker River Hydroelectric Project 0,33 1 1 1 0
Blackfoot Challenge (Montana, USA) 1 1 1 0,67 1
Canadian wildfire responder network 1 1 0,67 1 0,67
Collaborative flooding governance in Vietnam 0,67 0,33 0,33 0 0,67
Collaborative policy committees Gentofte 1 0,67 1 0,67 0,67
Collaborative policy committees Svelvik 0,67 1 0 1 0
Community Enterprise De Meevaart 0,33 0 1 1 1
Community Enterprise Het Klokhuis 0,67 0,33 1 0,67 1
Delaware Inland Bays 0 0,33 0,33 0,33 0
Desert Tortoise Habitat Conservation Planning 1 0,33 0,67 1 1
Foodborne disease outbreak in Germany 1 1 1 0,33 1
Friends of Redington Pass 0 0,67 1 1 0
Grow houses in the neighborhood 0,33 0,33 0,67 1 0,33
Homelessness policy Vancouver 0,33 1 0 0,33 0,33
Lake Tahoe 0,67 0,67 0,33 0,67 0,67
Local Network for Combating Illiteracy C 0,33 0 0,33 0 0
Local Network for Combating Illiteracy A 0,33 0 0 0 0,67
Local Network for Combating Illiteracy B 0,33 0,33 0,67 0,33 0,67
Peri-urban area development NL 0 0,33 1 1 0,33
Revitalisation of Central Dandenong 0,67 0 0,67 1 0,33
Rhode Island’s Salt Ponds 1 1 0,33 0,33 0,67
Spitex 0,33 1 1 1 0,33
Swedish wildfire responder network 1 0 0,33 0 0,33
Tampa Bay 0,67 0,67 0,33 0,33 0,67
Tillamook Bay, Oregon 0 0 0 0 0





Institutional Design 0,624 0,625
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possible but missing in practice is a case with no conducive Incentives, Institutional
Design or Leadership, but still with an intensive Process.
This could be interpreted as evidence that this configuration cannot occur in practice
(e.g. you cannot have a good Process without the other conditions), although this
collection of cases is arguably too small to support such a grand conclusion. For now,
the presence of eleven different configurations in our case collection allows us to analyze
what different pathways do or do not lead to Performance.
For the sufficiency analysis examining what (combination of) conditions need to
present in order to reach Performance, the minimally recommended consistency level
is 0.8 (Rihoux and Ragin, 2008), but a higher threshold can also be selected with an eye on
an observable drop in the consistency scores in the data (Vis, 2012). We therefore place
the cut-off point for the analysis of sufficiency at 0.921, including nine cases.
As we explore in more detail in the robustness checks at the end of this analysis, we
could have also gone for 0.801, including four extra cases. However, that threshold would
lead to a significant drop in the reliability of the analysis, as reflected by a drop in the
Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency (PRI) score from 0.855 to 0,670.
Different pathways to performance?
Proposition A held that all conditions of collaboration are necessary for achieving
collaborative outcomes, while proposition B held that different combinations of colla-
borative conditions can be sufficient for achieving collaborative outcomes. The results of
the QCA (Table 6) suggest a finding somewhere in between these two extremes. There are
two main pathways to performance, but they share a common starting point.
The first route combines conducive Incentives with strong Institutional Design and no
Process. The second route also starts with conducive Incentives, but combines this with
strong Leadership and intensive Process. Both pathways meet the thresholds for con-
sistency (>0,750) and coverage (>0,250) as formulated by Uruena and Hidalgo (2016),
meaning that these routes are both reliable predictors for the occurrence of Performance
and significant explanations for a large share of the Performance achieved (see table 6).
Table 6. Truth table for the occurrence of performance.
Incentives Institut. Design Leadership Process Number of cases Raw consist. PRI consist.
1 1 0 0 2 1,000 1,000
1 1 1 0 1 1,000 1,000
1 1 1 1 3 0,941 0,890
1 0 1 1 3 0,921 0,855
1 1 0 1 2 0,816 0,500
0 0 1 0 2 0,801 0,670
1 0 0 0 2 0,776 0,337
0 0 1 1 3 0,712 0,498
0 1 0 0 1 0,711 0,000
0 1 1 1 3 0,568 0,247
0 0 0 0 4 0,460 0,127
0 0 0 1 0 - -
0 1 0 1 0 - -
0 1 1 0 0 - -
1 0 0 1 0 - -
1 0 1 0 0 - -
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Each route was taken by a variety of cases. The three cases achieving performance
through the combination of Incentives and Institutional Design were situated in
Germany, Rhode Island USA, and Florida USA. These cases covered economic, environ-
mental, and public health policy domains. While two of these cases were self-initiated, the
third case was mandated.
The six cases combining Incentives with Leadership and Process to achieve Performance
came from Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and USA, covering different
policy domains, from culture and education to the environment and infrastructure. Half of
the cases were self-initiated collaborations, while the other half were mandated.
This diversity of cases within both routes might suggest that there is no direct link
between context factors such a country setting or policy domain and the path to
performance followed, although there may be more nuanced factors at work which
cannot be observed with the present selection of data from the case bank.
We conducted several further analyses to explore the robustness of our findings. An
analysis of the configurations which were associated with an absence of Performance
reinforced the important role of Incentives, but also underlined that it takes more than the
presence of Incentives to avoid failure (see Table 7, with further Table B1 in Appendix B).
Configurations which had Institutional Design, Leadership and Process present were
still associated with Performance failure if there were no Incentives present (0,858
consistency). Configurations were there were neither Incentives, Leadership, nor
Process conditions were strongly associated with failure (0,932 consistency), but the
same was true for configurations lacking Institutional Design, Leadership, and Process
(0,822 consistency). Again, Incentives prove to be important ingredient for collaborative
performance, but do not suffice by themselves.
Further analyses and checks
We conducted three further sensitivity analyses to examine the reliability of our findings.
First, we lowered the consistency threshold for the sufficiency analysis to the lowest
Table 7. Three pathways to the absence of performance.
Solutions for absence of performance Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency
No Institutional Design AND No Leadership AND No Process 0,368 0,053 0,822
No Incentives AND No Leadership AND No Process 0,368 0,053 0,932




Table 6. Two pathways to performance.
Solutions for Performance Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency
Incentives AND Institutional Design AND No Process 0,349 0,126 1,000




POLICY AND SOCIETY 11
acceptable threshold of 0,8 (Rihoux and Ragin, 2008). This generated a solution with
a slightly higher coverage (0,750) as four extra cases were deemed part of the
Performance outcome, but also a lower consistency score (0,790) as the set became
more diluted (see Appendix B for the relevant tables).
This analysis with a lower consistency threshold returned a solution which again
identified the two pathways to performance already discussed: One pathway combined
Incentives with Leadership, while the other pathway combined Incentives with Institutional
Design to achieve Performance. Interestingly, the solution contained a third pathway: In
one case, only Leadership was present while Incentives, Institutional Design, and Process
were absent, yet Performance was still achieved. This case, the regeneration of Area C in
Milan, suggests that in the absence of beneficial Incentives, strong Leadership may some-
times suffice to reach Performance.
We also conducted two sensitivity analyses of our calibration. For the first check, we
increased the threshold for membership, now only considering a sub-condition present if
they were awarded at least a 5 out of 5 by the case contributor instead of the 4 out of 5 in
our original calibration. For the second check, we lowered the threshold for membership,
counting all sub-conditions present if they scored just a 3 out of 5 (see appendix B for the
relevant tables and data).
The solutions generated by these alternative analyses reinforced our findings; most
pathways relied on the presence of Incentives in combination with other conditions,
while in a small share of cases strong Leadership could suffice to achieve Performance as
well. These alternative analyses did emphasize that beyond the opportunity of reaching
Performance through picking and choosing conditions, those cases that met all condi-
tions scored the highest possible consistency score of 1,00. In other words, securing all
conditions for Performance may not be the easiest pathway, but could be the surest way
to success.
Discussion and conclusion
Crucial starting point, different pathways
This analysis has sought to understand what conditions are necessary, and what combi-
nations of conditions are sufficient, for collaborations to achieve performance. The first
finding is that strong Incentives to Collaborate constitute a crucial starting point for
reaching collaborative outcomes. Almost all the routes identified to Performance com-
menced with Incentives. Even if all other conditions are present, the absence of
Incentives is strongly associated with Performance failure.
However, strong Incentives are not a fully necessary condition as some rare cases
achieve Performance by substituting strong Incentives with strong Leadership. The
Incentives to Collaborate could arguably be understood as a so-called INUS condition;
an insufficient but necessary part of a combination of causal factor, where this combina-
tion is unnecessary but sufficient configuration for reaching the outcome.
The second finding is that beyond the shared starting pointing of Incentives, there are
multiple combinations of conditions that lead to Performance. The two pathways most
consistently identified by our analysis combine Incentives with either strong Institutional
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Design or with strong Leadership and Process, although there cases which combine all
conditions to achieve Performance.
These findings shed a new light on the interdependence between the various condi-
tions deemed important for successful collaboration by our current theoretical models
(in this study chiefly represented by Ansell & Gash, 2008). Our findings suggest that the
various components in these models do not have to be considered as the one best way for
the achieving collaborative performance, but as roadmaps providing an overview of the
different possible pathways that could lead to performance.
Present limitations and future questions
These findings must be considered in light of the limitations of our research design. Firstly,
although the Collaborative Governance Case Database offers unparalleled access to a large
number of cases, we still run into the problem of missing data. The large comprehensive
model examined in this piece relies on a large set of lower level indicators and sub-
conditions. The database case format contains questions pertaining to all of the sub-
conditions, but in practice, case authors still miss data to provide answers to all of these
questions. This forced us to test only a subset of the sub-conditions we were interested in.
Secondly, the present analysis is centered mainly on the Ansell and Gash (2008) model,
with some insights from the Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) model. An obvious next step
would be to conduct similar analyses to test the models of other researchers. These models
examine different conditions for performance and may also suppose different types of
interdependence between the various conditions. For example, where Ansell and Gash see
incentives, leadership and institutional design as inputs for process, Bryson et al. (2006)
emphasize the interaction between collaborative process and structure.
Thirdly, this analysis used a comprehensive definition of performance, including
effectiveness, legitimacy, and adaptability. It may be interesting to see whether the
different pathways favor one of these sub-dimensions of performance. Do collaborations
with strong Institutional Design score better on Legitimacy? And do collaborations with
strong Process score better on Adaptability? And are the sub-dimensions of Performance
competing with each other (Hood, 1991; Talbot, 2008), or can successful collaborations
achieve all of them at once?
Finally, our present analysis provides no insights yet in why these collaborations
pursued different routes. Collaborations do not exist a vacuum, their choices are shaped
by a context of a ‘myriad political, legal, socioeconomic, environmental, and other
influences [. . .] that generate the energy and impetus to begin collaboration and set the
early direction’ (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 721). The different context or terrains
may make choosing a particular route not a choice but a necessity.
On the whole, researchers can take from the present research that our current
comprehensive models provide a good overview and starting point for our analysis,
but we need to advance our understanding of the different pathways collaborations can
follow through all the conditions. Practitioners can here take comfort in the idea these
models need not be used as an unattainable picture of a perfect collaboration, but
provide a useful overview of the different routes they can try to reach collaborative
performance.
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Appendix B.





Institutional Design 0.577 0.548





Table B2. Truth table for the absence of Performance.
Incentives Institut. Design Leadership Process Number of cases Raw consist. PRI consist.
0 0 0 0 4 0.921 0.873
0 1 1 1 3 0.858 0.752
0 0 1 1 3 0.713 0.501
1 0 1 1 3 0.537 0.145
1 1 1 1 3 0.526 0.110
1 0 0 0 2 0.886 0.663
1 1 0 1 2 0.816 0.500
0 0 1 0 2 0.596 0.330
1 1 0 0 2 0.744 0.000
0 1 0 0 1 1.000 1.000
1 1 1 0 1 0.543 0.000






Incentives AND Institutional Design 0,599 0,176 0,828
Incentives AND Leadership AND Process 0,499 0,100 0,908
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Table B4. Overview of cases at stricter calibration.
Case # Incentives Design Leadership Process Performance
Area C – Milan 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33
Baker River Hydroelectric Project 0,00 1,00 0,67 0,67 0,00
Blackfoot Challenge (Montana, USA) 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,67 0,67
Canadian wildfire responder network 1,00 0,67 0,00 1,00 0,33
Collaborative flooding governance in Vietnam 0,33 0,00 0,33 0,00 0,00
Collaborative policy committees Gentofte 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33
Collaborative policy committees Svelvik 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,00
Community Enterprise De Meevaart 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,67 0,67
Community Enterprise Het Klokhuis 0,00 0,00 0,67 0,33 0,67
Delaware Inland Bays 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Desert Tortoise Habitat Conservation Planning 0,33 0,33 0,67 0,67 1,00
Foodborne disease outbreak in Germany 0,33 0,33 0,67 0,00 0,67
Friends of Redington Pass 0,00 0,33 0,00 0,67 0,00
Grow houses in the neighborhood 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,00
Homelessness policy Vancouver 0,00 0,33 0,00 0,00 0,00
Lake Tahoe 0,67 0,00 0,33 0,00 0,67
Local Network for Combating Illiteracy C 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Local Network for Combating Illiteracy A 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Local Network for Combating Illiteracy B 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Peri-urban area development NL 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,00 0,00
Revitalisation of Central Dandenong 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,00 0,00
Rhode Island’s Salt Ponds 0,67 1,00 0,00 0,33 1,00
Spitex 0,00 0,33 1,00 0,33 0,00
Swedish wildfire responder network 0,33 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Tampa Bay 0,33 0,67 0,00 0,00 0,33
Tillamook Bay, Oregon 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Table B5. Truth table with stricter calibration.
Incentives Institut. Design Leadership Process Number of cases Raw consist. PRI consist.
0 0 0 0 14 0.177556 0.0299184
0 1 1 1 1 0.497487 0.24812
0 0 0 1 1 0.498113 0.198795
0 1 0 0 1 0.598187 0.331658
0 0 1 0 3 0.643011 0.378277
1 0 0 0 1 0.778524 0.50376
1 1 0 1 1 0.829146 0.66
0 0 1 1 2 0.87594 0.753731
1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0






Incentives AND Institutional Design AND No Leadership AND No
Process
0,348 0,199 1,000
No Incentives AND No Institutional Design AND Leadership AND
Process
0,349 0,200 0,876
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Table B7. Overview with looser calibration.
Case # Incentives Design Leadership Process Performance
Area C – Milan 0,33 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,67
Baker River Hydroelectric Project 0,33 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,33
Blackfoot Challenge (Montana, USA) 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Canadian wildfire responder network 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Collaborative flooding governance in Vietnam 0,67 0,67 0,33 0,00 1,00
Collaborative policy committees Gentofte 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,67 1,00
Collaborative policy committees Svelvik 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,67
Community Enterprise De Meevaart 0,67 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Community Enterprise Het Klokhuis 0,67 0,67 1,00 1,00 1,00
Delaware Inland Bays 0,33 1,00 0,33 0,67 0,33
Desert Tortoise Habitat Conservation Planning 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Foodborne disease outbreak in Germany 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,33 1,00
Friends of Redington Pass 0,67 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Grow houses in the neighborhood 1,00 1,00 0,67 1,00 0,67
Homelessness policy Vancouver 1,00 1,00 0,67 0,67 1,00
Lake Tahoe 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Local Network for Combating Illiteracy C 0,67 0,33 1,00 1,00 0,67
Local Network for Combating Illiteracy A 0,67 0,00 0,67 0,00 0,67
Local Network for Combating Illiteracy B 0,67 0,33 1,00 0,33 1,00
Peri-urban area development NL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Revitalisation of Central Dandenong 0,67 0,33 1,00 1,00 1,00
Rhode Island’s Salt Ponds 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,67 0,67
Spitex 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,67
Swedish wildfire responder network 1,00 0,00 0,33 0,00 1,00
Tampa Bay 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Tillamook Bay, Oregon 0,33 0,00 0,33 0,67 0,00
Table B8. Truth table with looser calibration.
Incentives Institut. Design Leadership Process
Number
of cases Raw consist.
PRI
consist.
1 1 1 1 14 0.953943 0.943541
1 0 1 1 3 0.89 0.876405
1 0 1 0 2 0.858369 0.835
0 1 1 1 2 0.89759 0.83
1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 0.801205 0.75188
0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0.492537 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0
Table B9. Solution with looser calibration.
Solutions for Performance Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency
Incentives AND Institutional Design AND No Process 0,140 0,016 1,000
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